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Abstract. A novel protocol, measurement-device-independent quantum key distri-
bution (MDI-QKD), removes all attacks from the detection system, the most vulnera-
ble part in QKD implementations. In this paper, we present an analysis for practical
aspects of MDI-QKD. To evaluate its performance, we study various error sources by
developing a general system model. We find that MDI-QKD is highly practical and
thus can be easily implemented with standard optical devices. Moreover, we present a
simple analytical method with only two (general) decoy states for the finite decoy-state
analysis. This method can be used directly by experimentalists to demonstrate MDI-
QKD. By combining the system model with the finite decoy-state method, we present
a general framework for the optimal choice of the intensities of the signal and decoy
states. Furthermore, we consider a common situation, namely asymmetric MDI-QKD,
in which the two quantum channels have different transmittances. We investigate its
properties and discuss how to optimize its performance. Our work is of interest not
only to experiments demonstrating MDI-QKD but also to other non-QKD experiments
involving quantum interference.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
21. Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2, 3] enables an unconditionally secure means of
distributing secret keys between two spatially separated parties, Alice and Bob. The
security of QKD has been rigorously proven based on the laws of quantum mechanics [4].
Nevertheless, owing to the imperfections in real-life implementations, a large gap
between its theory and practice remains unfilled. In particular, an eavesdropper (Eve)
may exploit these imperfections and launch specific attacks. This is commonly called
quantum hacking. The first successful quantum hacking against a commercial QKD
system was the time-shift attack [5] based on a proposal in [6]. More recently, the phase-
remapping attack [7] and the detector-control attack [8] have been implemented against
various practical QKD systems. Also, other attacks have appeared in the literature [9].
These results suggest that quantum hacking is a major problem for the real-life security
of QKD.
To close the gap between theory and practice, a natural attempt was to characterize
the specific loophole and find a countermeasure. For instance, Yuan, Dynes and Shields
proposed an efficient countermeasure against the detector-control attack [10]. Once
an attack is known, the prevention is usually uncomplicated. However, unanticipated
attacks are most dangerous, as it is impossible to fully characterize real devices and
account for all loopholes. Hence, researchers moved to the second approach – (full)
device-independent QKD [11]. It requires no specification of the internal functionality
of QKD devices and offers nearly perfect security. Its legitimate users (Alice and Bob)
can be treated as a quasi black box by assuming no memory attacks [12]. Nevertheless,
device-independent QKD is not really practical because it requires near-unity detection
efficiency and generates an extremely low key rate [13]. Therefore, to our knowledge,
there has been no experimental paper on device-independent QKD.
Fortunately, Lo, Curty and Qi have recently proposed an innovative scheme –
measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD) [14] – that removes all detector
side-channel attacks, the most important security loophole in conventional QKD
implementations [5, 6, 8, 9]. As an example of a MDI-QKD scheme (see Fig. 1), each
of Alice and Bob locally prepares phase-randomized signals (this phase randomization
process can be realized using a quantum random number generator such as [15]) in the
BB84 polarization states [1] and sends them to an untrusted quantum relay, Charles (or
Eve). Charles is supposed to perform a Bell state measurement (BSM) and broadcast
the measurement result. Since the measurement setting is only used to post-select
entanglement (in an equivalent virtual protocol [14]) between Alice and Bob, it can be
treated as a true black box. Hence, MDI-QKD is inherently immune to all attacks in
the detection system. This is a major achievement as MDI-QKD allows legitimate users
to not only perform secure quantum communications with untrusted relays ‡ but also
out-source the manufacturing of detectors to untrusted manufactures.
‡ This also implies the feasibility of “Pentagon Using China Satellite for U.S.-Africa Command”. See
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-29/pentagon-using-china-satellite-for-u-s-africa-command.html.
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Figure 1. MDI-QKD system model. WCP, weak coherent pulse; M, polarization
and intensity modulators; BS, beam splitter; PBS, polarization beam splitter; SPD,
single-photon detector. In MDI-QKD [14], each of Alice and Bob prepares BB84
states in combination with decoy states and sends them to an untrusted relay Charles
(or Eve), who is supposed to perform a Bell state measurement. As an example,
this figure considers a polarization-encoding scheme. Three unitary operators (U) are
used to model the polarization misalignment (or rotation); PBS2 is defined as the
fundamental measurement basis; U1 (U2) represents the polarization misalignment of
Alice’s (Bob’s) channel transmission, while U3 models the misalignment of the other
measurement setting, PBS1. In the ideal case without any polarization misalignment,
the rectilinear (Z) basis, used for key generation in Eq. (1), refers to the basis of PBS1
and PBS2.
Conceptually, the key insight of MDI-QKD is time reversal. This is in the same
spirit as one-way quantum computation [16]. More precisely, MDI-QKD built on
the idea of a time-reversed EPR protocol for QKD [17]. By combining the decoy-
state method [18] with the time-reversed EPR protocol, MDI-QKD gives both good
performance and good security.
MDI-QKD is highly practical and can be implemented with standard optical
components. The source can be a non-perfect single-photon source (together with the
decoy-state method), such as an attenuated laser diode emitting weak coherent pulses
(WCPs), and the measurement setting can be a simple BSM realized by linear optics.
Hence, MDI-QKD has attracted intensive interest in the QKD community. A number
of follow-up theoretical works have already been reported in [19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 23].
Meanwhile, experimental attempts on MDI-QKD have also been made by several
groups [26, 27, 28, 29]. Nonetheless, before it can be applied in real life, it is important
to address a number of practical issues. These include:
(i) Modelling the errors: an implementation of MDI-QKD may involve various error
sources such as the mode mismatch resulting in a non-perfect Hong-Ou-Mandel
(HOM) interference [30]. Thus, the first question is: how will these errors affect
the performance of MDI-QKD [32]? Or, what is the physical origin of the quantum
bit error rate (QBER) in a practical implementation?
(ii) Finite decoy-state protocol and finite-key analysis: as mentioned before, owing to
the lack of true single-photon sources [31], QKD implementations typically use
laser diodes emitting WCPs [3] and single-photon contributions are estimated by
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Figure 2. Asymmetric MDI-QKD. The two channels connecting Alice to Charles
and Bob to Charles have different transmittances. In real-life MDI-QKD, asymmetry
appeared naturally in a recent proof-of-concept experiment [26].
the decoy-state protocol [18]. In addition, a real QKD experiment is completed
in finite time, which means that the length of the output keys is finite. Thus,
the estimation of relevant parameters suffers from statistical fluctuations. This is
called the finite-key effect [33]. Hence, the second question is: how can one design a
practical finite decoy-state protocol and perform a finite-key analysis in MDI-QKD?
(iii) Choice of intensities: an experimental implementation needs to know the optimal
intensities for the signal and decoy states in order to optimize the system
performance. Previously, [21] and [22] have independently discussed the finite
decoy-state protocol. However, the high computational cost of the numerical
approach proposed in [21], together with the lack of a rigorous discussion of the
finite-key effect in both [21] and [22], makes the optimization of parameters difficult.
Thus, the third question is: how can one obtain these optimal intensities?
(iv) Asymmetric MDI-QKD: as shown in Fig. 2, in real life, it is quite common that the
two channels connecting Alice and Bob to Charles have different transmittances.
We call this situation asymmetric MDI-QKD. Importantly, this asymmetric
scenario appeared naturally in a recent proof-of-concept experiment [26], where
a tailored length of fiber was intentionally added in the short arm to balance the
two channel transmittances. Since an additional loss is introduced into the system,
it is unclear whether this solution is optimal. Hence, the final question is: how can
one optimize the performance of this asymmetric case?
The second question has already been discussed in [21, 22, 24] and solved in [34]. In
this paper, we offer additional discussions on this point and answer the other questions.
Our contributions are summarized below.
(i) To better understand the physical origin of the QBER, we propose generic models
for various error sources. In particular, we investigate two important error sources
– polarization misalignment and mode mismatch. We find that in a polarization-
encoding MDI-QKD system [14, 28, 29], polarization misalignment is the major
source contributing to the QBER and mode mismatch (in the time or frequency
5domain), however, does not appear to be a major problem. These results are shown
in Fig. 3 and Fig. 5. Moreover, we provide a mathematical model to simulate
a MDI-QKD system. This model is a useful tool for analyzing experimental
results and performing the optimization of parameters. Although this model is
proposed to study MDI-QKD, it is also useful for other non-QKD experiments
involving quantum interference, such as entanglement swapping [35] and linear
optics quantum computing [36]. This result is shown in Appendix B.
(ii) A previous method to analyze MDI-QKD with a finite number of decoy states
assumes that Alice and Bob can prepare a vacuum state [22]. Here, however,
we present an analytical approach with two general decoy states, i.e., without
the assumption of vacuum. This is particularly important for the practical
implementations, as it is usually difficult to create a vacuum state in decoy-state
QKD experiments [37, 38]. The different intensities are usually generated with
an intensity modulator, which has a finite extinction ratio (e.g., around 30 dB).
Additionally, we also simulate the expected key rates numerically and thus present
an optimized method with two decoy states. Ignoring for the moment the finite-key
effect, experimentalists can directly use this method to obtain a rough estimation
of the system performance. Table 2 contains the main results for this point.
(iii) By combining the system model, the finite decoy-state protocol, and the finite-key
analysis of [34], we offer a general framework to determine the optimal intensities of
the signal and decoy states. Notice that this framework has already been adopted
and verified in the experimental demonstration reported in [29]. These results are
shown in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7.
(iv) Finally, we model and evaluate the performance of an asymmetric MDI-QKD
system. This allows us to study its properties and determine the experimental
configuration that maximizes its secret key rate. These results are shown in Table 3
and Fig. 8.
2. Preliminary
The secure key rate of MDI-QKD in the asymptotic case (i.e., assuming an infinite
number of decoy states and signals) is given by [14]
R ≥ P 1,1Z Y 1,1Z [1−H2(e1,1X )]−QZfe(EZ)H2(EZ), (1)
where Y 1,1Z and e
1,1
X are, respectively, the yield (i.e., the probability that Charles
declares a successful event) in the rectilinear (Z) basis and the error rate in the
diagonal (X) basis given that both Alice and Bob send single-photon states (P 1,1Z
denotes this probability in the Z basis); H2 is the binary entropy function given by
H2(x)=−x log2(x) − (1 − x) log2(1 − x); QZ and EZ denote, respectively, the gain and
QBER in the Z basis and fe ≥ 1 is the error correction inefficiency function. Here we
use the Z basis for key generation and the X basis for testing only [39]. In practice, QZ
6and EZ are directly measured in the experiment, while Y
1,1
Z and e
1,1
X can be estimated
using the finite decoy-state method.
Next, we introduce some additional notations. We consider one signal state and two
weak decoy states for the finite decoy-state protocol. The parameter µ is the intensity
(i.e., the mean photon number per optical pulse) of the signal state §. ν and ω are the
intensities of the two decoy states, which satisfy µ > ν > ω ≥ 0. The sets {µa,νa,ωa} and
{µb,νb,ωb} contain respectively Alice’s and Bob’s intensities. The sets {µopta ,νopta ,ωopta }
and {µoptb ,νoptb ,ωoptb } denote the optimal intensities that maximize the key rate. Lac
and ta (Lbc and tb) denote the channel distance and transmittance from Alice (Bob) to
Charles. In the case of a fiber-based system, ta=10
−αLac/10 with α denoting the channel
loss coefficient (α≈0.2 dB/km for a standard telecom fiber). ηd is the detector efficiency
and Y0 is the background rate that includes detector dark counts and other background
contributions. The parameters ed, et, and em denote, respectively, the errors associated
with the polarization misalignment, the time-jitter and the total mode mismatch (see
definitions below).
3. Practical error sources
In this section, we consider the original MDI-QKD setting [14], i.e., the symmetric
case with ta=tb. The asymmetric case will be discussed in Section 6. To model the
practical error sources, we focus on the fiber-based polarization-encoding MDI-QKD
system proposed in [14] and demonstrated in [28, 29]. Notice, however, that with
some modifications, our analysis can also be applied to other implementations such as
free-space transmission, the phase-encoding scheme and the time-bin-encoding scheme.
See also [20] and [25] respectively for models of phase-encoding and time-bin-encoding
schemes.
A comprehensive list of practical error sources is as follows ‖.
(i) Polarization misalignment (or rotation).
(ii) Mode mismatch including time-jitter, spectral mismatch and pulse-shape mismatch.
(iii) Fluctuations of the intensities (modulated by Alice and Bob) at the source.
(iv) Background rate.
(v) Asymmetry of the beam splitter.
Here, we primarily analyze the first two error sources, i.e., polarization
misalignment and mode mismatch. The other error sources present minor contributions
to the QBER in practice, and are discussed in Appendix A.
§ We assume that the coherent state is phase-randomized. Thus, its photon number follows a Poisson
distribution of mean µ.
‖ This list does not consider the state-preparation error [19, 22], because a strict discussion about this
problem is related to the security proof of MDI-QKD, which will be considered in future publications.
73.1. Polarization misalignment
Polarization misalignment (or rotation) is one of the most significant factors contributing
to the QBER in not only the polarization-encoding BB84 system [1] but also the
polarization-encoding MDI-QKD system. Since MDI-QKD requires two transmitting
channels and one BSM (instead of one channel and a simple measurement as in the
BB84 protocol), it is cumbersome to model its polarization misalignment. Here, we
solve this problem by proposing a simple model in Fig. 1. One of the polarization beam
splitters (PBS2 in Fig. 1) is defined as the fundamental measurement basis ¶. Three
unitary operators, {U1, U2, U3}, are considered to model the polarization misalignment
of each channel [36]. The operator U1 (U2) represents the misalignment of Alice’s (Bob’s)
channel transmission, while U3 models the misalignment of the other measurement
setting, PBS1.
For simplicity, we consider a simplified model with a 2-dimensional unitary matrix +
Uk =
(
cos θk − sin θk
sin θk cos θk
)
, (2)
where k=1, 2, 3 and θk (polarization-rotation angle) is in the range of [−π,π]. For
each value of k, we define the polarization misalignment error ek=sin
2 θk and the total
error ed=
∑3
k=1 ek. Note that ed is equivalent to the systematic QBER in a polarization-
encoding BB84 system.
ηd ed Y0 fe em
14.5% 1.5% 6.02× 10−6 1.16 2%
Table 1. List of practical parameters for all numerical simulations. These
experimental parameters, including the detection efficiency ηd, the total misalignment
error ed and the background rate Y0, are from the 144km QKD experiment reported
in [43]. Since two SPDs are used in [43], the background rate of each SPD here is
roughly half of the value there. We assume that the four SPDs in MDI-QKD (see
Fig. 1) have identical ηd and Y0. The parameter em is the total mode mismatch that
is quantified from the experimental values of [29].
From the model of Fig. 1, we can analyze the effect of polarization misalignment by
evaluating the secure key rate given by Eq. (1). See Appendix B for details. By using
the practical parameters listed in Table 1, we perform a numerical simulation of the
asymptotic key rates for different values of polarization misalignment, ed. The result
is shown in Fig. 3. In this simulation, we temporarily ignore mode mismatch (i.e., set
¶ Although we use PBS2 as the reference basis, the method is also applicable to other reference bases
such as PBS1.
+ That is, if we denote the two incoming modes in the horizontal and vertical polarization by the
creation operators a†h and a
†
v, and the outgoing modes by b
†
h and b
†
v, then the unitary operator yields
an evolution of the form b†h = cos θka
†
h − sin θka†v and b†v = sin θka†h + cos θka†v. This unitary matrix is
a simple form rather than the general one (see Section I.A in [36]). Nonetheless, we believe that the
result for a more general unitary transformation will be similar to our simulation results.
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Figure 3. Polarization misalignment tolerance. Following the model illustrated
in Fig. 1, we incorporate the polarization misalignment into the derivation of the
asymptotic key rate given by Eq. (1). We find that MDI-QKD is robust against
practical errors due to polarization misalignment.
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Figure 4. Model for mode mismatch in the time domain (time-jitter). Alice’s
state is defined as the reference basis, while Bob’s state is a superposition of Alice’s
fundamental mode |Ta〉 and the orthogonal mode |Ta〉 (see Eq. (3)).
em=0 in Table 1) and make two practical assumptions for the polarization misalignment:
a) each polarization-rotation angle, θk, follows a Gaussian distribution with a standard
deviation of θstdk = arcsin(
√
ek); and b) the probability distribution of ek is selected as
e1=e2=0.475ed and e3=0.05ed
∗. Fig. 3 shows that a polarization-encoding system can
tolerate up to about 6.7% polarization misalignment at 0 km, while at 120 km it can
only tolerate up to 5% misalignment. It also shows that MDI-QKD is moderately robust
to errors due to polarization misalignment.
3.2. Mode mismatch
We primarily use the model of mode mismatch in time domain, called time-jitter ♯, to
discuss our method. This model is shown in Fig. 4. We describe Alice’s and Bob’s
∗ Two remarks for the distribution of the three unitary operators: a) We assume that the two
channel transmissions, i.e., U1 and U2, introduce much larger polarization misalignments than the
other measurement basis, U3 (PBS1 in Fig. 1), because PBS1 is located in Charles’s local station and
can be carefully aligned (in principle). Hence, we choose e1=e2=0.475ed and e3=0.05ed. b) Notice that
the simulation result is more or less independent of the distribution of ek.
♯ Time-jitter is the variance in arrival times of Alice’s and Bob’s packets at Charles’s station.
9quantum states in the time domain as
Alice : |φa〉 = |Ta〉
Bob : |φb〉 = α|Ta〉+ β|Ta〉, (3)
where |Ta〉 is the orthogonal time mode of |Ta〉, β=√et, α=
√
1− et, and et is defined as
the time-jitter that represents the probability of Alice’s state not overlapping with that
of Bob ††.
This model is a very general method that can be used to study the mode mismatch
problem in other domains for a variety of quantum optics experiments involving
quantum interference. For instance, a similar discussion can be applied to the spectral
(wavelength) mismatch if we write Eq. (3) in the frequency domain. One can also refer
to [45] for a general discussion about the spectral mismatch. Considering Eq. (3) in the
form of Alice’s and Bob’s pulse shapes, we can also analyze the pulse-shape mismatch.
Here we define the total mode mismatch in all domains as em.
Next, let us discuss how em affects the key rate given by Eq. (1). As illustrated in
Fig. 1, the overlapping modes between Alice’s and Bob’s pulses experience a HOM
interference at the beam splitter (BS), while the non-overlapping modes transmit
through the BS without interference. Assuming that ηd ≫ Y0 and ignoring the
polarization misalignment for the moment, we find that the mode mismatch only affects
the gains and the error rates in the X basis rather than those in the Z basis [46]. Hence,
in Eq. (1), em mainly affects e
1,1
X . In practice, e
1,1
X can be estimated from the finite decoy-
state protocol, i.e., from the gains (QX) and QBERs (EX) in the X basis. Similar to
the analysis of the polarization misalignment in Section 3.1, we can incorporate em into
the derivations of QX and EX following the method of Appendix B [47].
Using the parameters of Table 1, we simulate the asymptotic key rates for different
values of em. The results are shown in Fig. 5. In this simulation, we temporarily ignore
polarization misalignment (i.e., we set ed=0) and only focus on mode mismatch. At 0
km, we find that the system can tolerate up to 80% mode mismatch and at 120 km, the
tolerable value is about 50%. Hence, a polarization-encoding MDI-QKD system is less
sensitive to mode mismatch than to polarization misalignment [48]. Notice also that
we have quantified the value of em (see Table 1) by using the experimental parameters
from [29] and find that em is usually small in practice (e.g., below 5%). Therefore, mode
mismatch does not appear to be a major problem in a MDI-QKD implementation.
†† In experiment, the value of et can be quantified from the fidelity between the two pulses in time
domain. This fidelity can be obtained by measuring the pulse width and the time-jitter value between
the two pulses. From the experimental values of [29], et is below 1.5%.
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Figure 5. Mode mismatch tolerance. In the asymptotic case, a polarization-
encoding MDI-QKD system can tolerate up to 80% mode mismatch at 0 km.
Mode mismatch does not appear to be a major problem in a polarization-encoding
implementation of MDI-QKD.
4. Finite decoy-state protocol with two general decoy states
In a MDI-QKD implementation, by performing the measurements for the different
intensities used by Alice and Bob, we can obtain [14]
QqaqbZ =
∑
n,m=0
e−(qa+qb)
qna
n!
qmb
m!
Y n,mZ , (4)
QqaqbX E
qaqb
X =
∑
n,m=0
e−(qa+qb)
qna
n!
qmb
m!
Y n,mX e
n,m
X , (5)
where qa (qb) denotes Alice’s (Bob’s) intensity setting, Q
qaqb
Z (E
qa,qb
X ) denotes the gain
(QBER) in the Z (X) basis with the intensity pair {qa, qb}, and Y n,mZ (en,mX ) denotes the
yield (error rate) given that Alice and Bob send respectively an n-photon and m-photon
pulse. Here the goal of the finite decoy-state protocol is to estimate Y 1,1Z and e
1,1
X (used
to generate a secure key) from the set of linear equations given by Eqs. (4) and (5) using
different intensity settings [49]. More specifically, we estimate a lower bound for Y 1,1Z
and an upper bound for e1,1X . We denote these two bounds respectively as Y
1,1
Z,L and e
1,1
X,U .
Y 1,1Z,L ≥ 1(µa−ωa)(µb−ωb)(νa−ωa)(νb−ωb)(µa−νa)×
[(µ2a − ω2a)(µb − ωb)(QνaνbZ e(νa+νb) +QωaωbZ e(ωa+ωb) −QνaωbZ e(νa+ωb) −QωaνbZ e(ωa+νb))−
(ν2a − ω2a)(νb − ωb)(QµaµbZ eµa+µb +QωaωbZ e(ωa+ωb) −QµaωbZ e(µa+ωb) −QωaµbZ e(ωa+µb)]
e1,1X,U ≥ 1(νa−ωa)(νb−ωb)Y 1,1X,L×
[e(νa+νb)QνaνbX E
νaνb
X + e
(ωa+ωb)QωaωbX E
ωaωb
X − e(νa+ωb)QνaωbX EνaωbX − e(ωa+νb)QωaνbX Eωaνb]
Table 2. Analytical equations for the two decoy-state protocol. See the main
text for details. Here, for the estimation of Y 1,1Z,L, we only consider one case and refer
to Eq. (7) for the other case. Ignoring the finite-key effect, these results can be directly
used by experimentalists to obtain an estimation of the expected system performance.
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The general approach for the finite decoy-state protocol has been discussed in [34].
In this section, however, we present a much simpler analytical method with only two
decoy states. The final results are summarized in Table 2. They can be directly used by
experimentalists (without knowing the details of [34]) to obtain a rough estimation of
the expected system performance. Notice that our notations are different from [34] in
that we primarily estimate the probabilities in the case of an infinite number of signals,
while [34] focuses on the estimation of counts by incorporating the finite-key effect.
Now, let us start to discuss this two decoy-state protocol. As mentioned before,
the intensities of the signal and decoy states satisfy µ > ν > ω and our protocol is
applicable to either ω = 0 or ω 6= 0. The key method to estimate Y 1,1Z,L from Eq. (4) can
be divided into two steps:
(i) Cancel out the terms Y 0mZ and Y
n0
Z using Gaussian elimination.
(ii) Cancel out either the term Y 12Z or Y
21
Z depending on the intensity values selected
in the first step.
For the first step, we choose intensity pairs from {µa, ωa, µb, ωb} and {νa, ωa, νb,
ωb} [50], and generate two quantities QM1Z and QM2Z given by
QM1Z = Q
νaνb
Z e
(νa+νb) +QωaωbZ e
(ωa+ωb) −QνaωbZ e(νa+ωb) −QωaνbZ e(ωa+νb),
QM2Z = Q
µaµb
Z e
(µa+µb) +QωaωbZ e
(ωa+ωb) −QµaωbZ e(µa+ωb) −QωaµbZ e(ωa+µb).
To cancel out Y 12Z or Y
21
Z , we consider two cases.
Case 1. (µa+ωa
νa+ωa
≤ µb+ωb
νb+ωb
) we use (µ2b−ω2b )(µa−ωa)×QM1Z minus (ν2b−ω2b )(νa−ωa)×QM2Z
to cancel out Y 12Z . Thus, Y
1,1
Z,L is given by
(µ2a − ω2a)(µb − ωb)QM1Z − (ν2a − ω2a)(νb − ωb)QM2Z
(µa − ωa)(µb − ωb)(νa − ωa)(νb − ωb)(µa − νa) . (6)
Case 2. (µa+ωa
νa+ωa
> µb+ωb
νb+ωb
) we cancel out Y 21Z using the same method as in case 1 and
derive Y 1,1Z,L as
(µ2b − ω2b )(µa − ωa)QM1Z − (ν2b − ω2b )(νa − ωa)QM2Z
(µa − ωa)(µb − ωb)(νa − ωa)(νb − ωb)(µb − νb) . (7)
Similarly, the strategy to estimate e1,1X,U from Eq. (5) requires to cancel out Y
0,m
X e
0,m
X
and Y n,0X e
n,0
X . Thus, we choose intensity pairs from {νa, ωa, νb, ωb} [51] and derive e1,1X,U
as
1
(νa − ωa)(νb − ωb)Y 1,1X,L
[e(νa+νb)QνaνbX E
νaνb
X + e
(ωa+ωb)QωaωbX E
ωaωb
X
− e(νa+ωb)QνaωbX EνaωbX − e(ωa+νb)QωaνbX Eωaνb].
where Y 1,1X,L can be estimated using a similar method to that for Y
1,1
Z,L [52]. The final
equations are summarized in Table 2.
12
 
Step1 
• Quantify the parameters and errors of the system. 
Step2 
• Model the system to derive the expected gain and QBER. 
Step3 
• Implement the finite decoy-state protocol. 
Step4 
• Apply the finite-key analysis. 
Step5 
• Perform the numerical optimization. 
Figure 6. Framework to choose the optimal intensities. Step 1 is to quantify
the parameters and errors of the system (see Table 1 for some representative values).
Step 2 is to model the system, i.e., derive the gain and QBER by incorporating the
practical error sources (see Appendix B for the case of a polarization based system).
Step 3 is to implement the finite decoy-state protocol (see Section 4). Step 4 is to
apply the finite-key analysis [34]. Step 5 is to perform the numerical optimization to
get the optimal intensities as well as other parameters such as the optimal selection
for the probabilities of different intensity settings.
5. Optimal choice of intensities
In this section, we develop a general framework to choose the optimal intensity values
for the signal and decoy states. This framework is shown in Fig. 6, and is composed of
five steps.
(i) Quantify the parameters and errors of the system. For simulation purposes, we will
consider the parameters shown in Table 1.
(ii) Model the system using the techniques presented in Section 3. A complete model
for a polarization-encoding MDI-QKD can be found in Appendix B.
(iii) Implement the finite decoy-state protocol. For this, we will consider the analytical
method with two decoy states introduced in Section 4. In the simulation, for the
weakest decoy state ω, we set its minimum value at 5× 10−4 (per pulse) [53].
(iv) Apply the finite-key analysis. Here, we employ the rigorous finite-key analysis
of [34] and consider a total number of signals N=1014 [54] together with a security
bound of ǫ=10−10.
(v) Perform the numerical optimization. In our simulation, we use a MATLAB program
to maximize the secure key rate and thus obtain the optimal parameters under
different channel transmittances.
Based on this framework, the optimal intensities that maximize the key rate at
different transmission distances are shown in Fig. 7. Notice also that our approach
has already been applied to the experimental demonstration reported in [29], where
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Figure 7. Optimal intensities. These intensity values are obtained by numerically
maximizing the key rate in the finite-key case. They correspond to the situation
where µopta =µ
opt
b =µ
opt and νopta =ν
opt
b =ν
opt. The other decoy state ω is optimized at
its minimum value, i.e., ωopta =ω
opt
b =5 × 10−4. Here we use the method described in
Section 4 for the finite decoy-state protocol and that of [34] for the finite-key analysis.
For this, we consider a total number of signals N=1014 together with a security bound
of ǫ=10−10. The non-smooth behaviors in the figure are mainly due to the lack of
numerical accuracy.
the polarization misalignment is around 0.7% and the total mode mismatch is below
2%. Owing to the low operation rate there, the value of ω is set to 0.01. The optimal
intensities in this scenario are µopta =µ
opt
b ≈0.3 and νopta =νoptb ≈0.1.
6. Asymmetric MDI-QKD
A schematic diagram of the asymmetric MDI-QKD is shown in Fig. 2. Note that this
asymmetric scenario appeared naturally in a recent field-test experiment performed in
Calgary [26]. Another concrete illustration can be found at the Tokyo QKD network [55],
in which the asymmetric case occurs if Koganei-1 (Alice) and Koganei-3 (Bob) use
Koganei-2 (Charles) as the quantum relay to perform MDI-QKD, where the two fiber
links are respectively 90 km and 1 km. Here we define a parameter x to quantify the ratio
of the two channel transmittances, i.e., x = ta/tb. In the Calgary’s system, x=0.752,
while in the Tokyo QKD network x=0.017.
6.1. Problem identification
The main question here is how to choose the optimal intensities in this asymmetric
situation. In the asymptotic case, these optimal intensities refer to the two signal states
µopta and µ
opt
b . Let us discuss two possible options.
The first option is to choose µopta =µ
opt
b with both in O(1). If we ignore the
system imperfections such as background counts and other practical errors, the error
rates (e1,1X and EZ in Eq. 1) will be zero, while P
1,1
Z Y
1,1
Z can be maximized with
µopta =µ
opt
b =1 (see Appendix B.1 for the details). However, in practice, it is inevitable
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Figure 8. Key rate comparision with 50km channel mismatch. We assume a
fixed channel mismatch, x=0.1 (Lac-Lbc=50km). In the symmetric choice (Symmetry
in figure), we set µata=µbtb, while in the optimal choice (Optimum in figure), we non-
trivially determine the optimal intensities by numerical simulation. The red curves
are evaluated by the two decoy-state protocol (Section 4) combined with the finite-key
analysis of [34]. Note that in each curve, all the intensities of the signal and decoy states
are optimized by maximizing the key rate. On average, the key rate with the optimal
choice is around 80% larger than that with the symmetric choice in both asymptotic
and two decoy-state cases.
to have some practical errors such as the polarization misalignment discussed above.
A relatively large intensity in the short channel will significantly increase the QBER
due to the misalignment. Moreover, owing to the intensity mismatch on Charles’s side
(µopta ta 6=µoptb tb), the quantum interference known as the HOM dip, will be imperfect. As
a consequence, this option leads to a relatively large QBER, which decreases the key
rate due to the cost of error correction.
To minimize the QBER, a second option is to choose µopta ta=µ
opt
b tb regardless of
x. We denote this situation as the symmetric choice (indicated by Symmetry in Fig. 8
and Table 3). An equivalent implementation scheme for this option is to add a tailored
length of fiber in the local station of the sender with the short channel transmission (i.e.,
Bob in Fig. 2) in order to balance the two channel transmittances. In fact, such a scheme
was recently implemented in a proof-of-principle MDI-QKD experiment [26]. However,
when x is far from 1, to satisfy µata=µbtb, either µa or µb needs to be relatively small.
Hence, we cannot derive good bounds for P 1,1Z Y
1,1
Z and e
1,1
X . In particular, the increase
of e1,1X results in the decrease of the key rate due to the cost of privacy amplification.
In summary, we find that both of the above two options are sub-optimal. We
present the optimal choice below.
6.2. Summary of results
The optimal choice (indicated by Optimum in Fig. 8 and Table 3) that maximizes
the key rate can be determined from numerical optimizations. Here we perform such
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Asymptotic case Two decoy-state case
Parameters Symmetry Optimum Symmetry Optimum
x = 0.1 µa µb µ
opt
a µ
opt
b µa µb µ
opt
a µ
opt
b
Lbc=0km 0.75 0.08 0.60 0.15 0.49 0.05 0.46 0.08
Lbc=10km 0.75 0.08 0.60 0.15 0.46 0.05 0.41 0.07
Lbc=20km 0.75 0.08 0.60 0.15 0.41 0.03 0.38 0.06
Table 3. Optimal intensities of an asymmetric MDI-QKD system. The
channel mismatch is fixed at x=0.1 and thus Lac={50km, 60km, 70km}. In the
asymptotic case, the ratio µopta /µ
opt
b for the optimal choice is around 4. In the
symmetric choice, this ratio is 10. The parameters µopta and µ
opt
b are fixed regardless of
ta and tb (see Theorem 1 in Appendix C.1). In the two decoy-state case (with different
Lbc), the optimal intensities for the decoy state ν are about {νa=0.10, νb=0.01} for
the symmetric choice and {νopta =0.07, νoptb =0.01} for the optimal choice. The optimal
value for the weakest decoy state is ωopta =ω
opt
b =5 × 10−4 for both choices. From the
intensity values in this table, we find that the optimal choice for µa and µb does
not always satisfy µopta ta=µ
opt
b tb, but the ratio µ
opt
a ta/µ
opt
b tb is near 1. Also, in the
asymptotic case, µopta and µ
opt
b are only determined by x instead of ta or tb.
optimizations and also analyze the properties of asymmetric MDI-QKD. Our main
results are:
(i) In the asymptotic case, the optimal choice for µa and µb does not always satisfy
µopta ta=µ
opt
b tb, but the ratio µ
opt
a ta/µ
opt
b tb is near 1. For x<1, µ
opt
a ta/µ
opt
b tb∈[0.3, 1); for
x≥1, µopta ta/µoptb tb∈[1, 3.5]; This result can be seen from Fig. C2). In the practical
case with the two decoy-state protocol and finite-key analysis, {µopta , µoptb } and {νopta ,
νoptb } satisfy a similar condition with the ratio µopta ta/µoptb tb (or νopta ta/νoptb tb) near
1, while {ωopta , ωoptb } are optimized at their smallest value. See Table 3 for further
details.
(ii) In an asymmetric system with x=0.1 (50 km length difference for two standard fiber
links), the advantage of the optimal choice is shown in Fig. 8, where the key rate
with the optimal choice is around 80% larger than that with the symmetric choice
in both asymptotic and practical cases [56]. We remark that when x is far from
1, this advantage is more significant. For instance, with x=0.01 (100 km length
difference), the key rate with the optimal choice is about 150% larger than that
with the symmetric choice.
(iii) In the asymptotic case, at a short distance where background counts can be ignored:
µopta and µ
opt
b are only determined by x instead of ta or tb (see the optimal intensities
in Table 3 and Theorem 1 in Appendix C); assuming a fixed x, µopta and µ
opt
b can
be analytically derived and the optimal key rate is quadratically proportional to tb
(see Appendix C).
Finally, notice that the channel transmittance ratio in Calgary’s asymmetric system
is near 1 (x=0.752), hence the optimal choice can slightly improve the key rate compared
to the symmetric choice (around 2% improvement). However, in Tokyo’s asymmetric
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system (x=0.017), the optimal choice can significantly improve the key rate by over
130%.
7. Discussion and Conclusion
A key assumption in MDI-QKD [14] is that Alice and Bob trust their devices for the
state preparation, i.e., they can generate ideal quantum states in the BB84 protocol.
One approach to remove this assumption is to quantify the imperfections in the state
preparation part and thus include them into the security proofs [19]. We believe that
this assumption is practical because Alice’s and Bob’s quantum states are prepared
by themselves and thus can be experimentally verified in a fully protected laboratory
environment outside of Eve’s interference. For instance, based on an earlier proposal [57],
C. C. W. Lim et al. have introduced another interesting scheme [58] in which each of
Alice and Bob uses an entangled photon source (instead of WCPs) and quantifies the
state-preparation imperfections via random sampling. That is, Alice and Bob randomly
sample parts of their prepared states and perform a local Bell test on these samples.
Such a scheme is very promising, as it is in principle a fully device-independent approach.
It can be applied in short-distance communications.
In conclusion, we have presented an analysis for practical aspects of MDI-QKD.
To understand the physical origin of the QBER, we have investigated various practical
error sources by developing a general system model. In a polarization-encoding MDI-
QKD system, polarization misalignment is the major source contributing to the QBER.
Hence, in practice, an efficient polarization management scheme such as polarization
feedback control [28, 59] can significantly improve the polarization stabilization and
thus generate a higher key rate. We have also discussed a simple analytical method
for the finite decoy-state analysis, which can be directly used by experimentalists to
demonstrate MDI-QKD. In addition, by combining the system model with the finite
decoy-state method, we have presented a general framework for the optimal intensities
of the signal and decoy states. Furthermore, we have studied the properties of the
asymmetric MDI-QKD protocol and discussed how to optimize its performance. Our
work is relevant to both QKD and general experiments on quantum interference.
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Figure A1. Background counts tolerance. Following the model discussed in
Section Appendix B, we simulate the asymptotic key rates at different background
count rates. MDI-QKD is robust to background counts.
Appendix A. Other practical errors
Here, we discuss other practical error sources and show that their contribution to the
QBER is not very significant in a practical MDI-QKD system. For this reason, they are
ignored in our simulations.
Appendix A.1. Intensity fluctuations at the source
The intensity fluctuations of the signal and decoy states at the source are relatively
small (∼ 0.1 dB) [38]. Additionally, Alice and Bob can in principle locally and precisely
quantify their own intensities. Therefore, this error source can be mostly ignored in the
theoretical model that analyzes the performance of practical MDI-QKD (but one could
easily include it in the analysis).
Appendix A.2. Threshold detector with background counts
The threshold single photon detector (SPD) can be modeled by a beam splitter with
ηd transmission and (1-ηd) reflection. The transmission part is followed by a unity
efficiency detector, while the reflection part is discarded. ηd is defined as the detector
efficiency. Background counts can be treated to be independent of the incoming signals.
For simplicity, the system model discussed in Section Appendix B assumes that the four
SPDs (see Fig. 1) are identical and have a detection efficiency ηd and a background rate
Y0. Note, however, that if this condition is not satisfied (i.e., there is some detection
efficiency mismatch) our system model can be adapted to take care also of this case.
All the simulations reported in the main text already consider a background rate
of Y0=6.02×10−6 (see Table 1). Fig. A1 simulates more general cases of the asymptotic
key rates at different background count rates. At 0 km, the MDI-QKD system can
tolerate up to 10−3 (per pulse) background counts.
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Figure A2. Wavelength dependence of a fiber-based beam splitter. If the
laser wavelength is 1542 nm [29], the beam splitter ratio is 0.5007, which introduces
negligible QBER (below 0.01%) in a typical MDI-QKD system.
Appendix A.3. Beam splitter ratio
In practice, for telecom wavelengths, the asymmetry of the beam splitter (BS) (i.e.,
not 50:50) is usually small. For instance, the wavelength dependence of the fiber-based
BS in our lab (Newport-13101550-5050 fiber coupler) is experimentally quantified in
Fig. A2. If the laser wavelength is 1542 nm [29], the BS ratio is 0.5007, which introduces
negligible QBER (below 0.01%) in a MDI-QKD system. Hence, this error source can
also be ignored in the theoretical model of MDI-QKD.
Appendix B. System model – analytical key rate
In this section, we discuss an analytical method to model a polarization-encoding MDI-
QKD system. That is, we calculate Y 1,1Z , e
1,1
X , QZ and EZ and thus estimate the expected
key rate from Eq. (1).
To simplify our calculation, we make two assumptions about the practical error
sources: a) since most practical error sources do not contribute significantly to the
system performance, we only consider the polarization misalignment ed, the background
count rate Y0 and the detector efficiency ηd; b) for the model of the polarization
misalignment, we consider only two unitary operators, U1 and U2, to represent
respectively the polarization misalignment of Alice’s and Bob’s channel transmission,
i.e., set U3=I in the generic model of Sec. 3.1. For simplicity, a more rigorous derivation
with U3 6= I is not shown here, but it can be easily completed following our procedures
discussed below.
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Appendix B.1. Y 1,1Z and e
1,1
X
In the asymptotic case, we assume that Y 1,1Z and e
1,1
X in Eq. (1) can be perfectly estimated
with an infinite number of signals and decoy states. Thus, they are given by
e1,1X =
1
2
− tatbη
2
d(1− ed)2(1− Y0)2
4Y 1,1X
, (B.1)
Y 1,1Z = (1− Y0)2[4Y 20 (1− taηd)(1− tbηd)
+2Y0(taηd + tbηd − 3tatbη
2
d
2
) +
tatbη
2
d
2
],
where Y 1,1X =Y
1,1
Z . Importantly, we can see that ignoring the imperfections of polarization
misalignment and background counts (i.e., ed = 0, Y0 = 0), e
1,1
X is zero, while P
1,1
Z Y
1,1
Z
(P 1,1Z =µaµbe
−(µa+µb)) can be maximized with µa=µb. Thus, the optimal choice of
intensities is µa=µb=1. However, in practice, it is inevitable to have certain practical
errors, which result in this optimal choice being a function of the values of practical
errors.
Appendix B.2. QZ and EZ
Now, let us calculate QZ and EZ , which are eventually given by Eq. (B.12). To further
simplify our discussion, we use {horizonal,vertical,45-degree,135-degree} to represent
the BB84 polarization states. Also, {HH,HV,++,+−} will denote Alice’s and Bob’s
encoding modes. We define the following notations:
γa =
√
µataηd, γb =
√
µbtbηd,
β = γaγb, γ = γ
2
a + γ
2
b ,
λ = γaγb
√
ed1(1− ed1), ω = γ2a + ed1(γ2b − γ2a).
Appendix B.2.1. Derivation of QHHZ First, both Alice and Bob encode their states in
the H mode (symmetric to V mode). We assume that U1 and U2 (see Eq. (2)) rotate
the polarization in the same direction, i.e. θ1θ2 > 0. The discussion regarding rotation
in the opposite direction (i.e. θ1θ2 < 0) is in Appendix B.2.4.
In Charles’s lab, after the BS and PBS (see Fig. 1), the optical intensities received
by each SPD are given by
Dch : |A|2 = (1− ed1)(γ
2
a + γ
2
b )− 2γaγb cos(φ)(1− ed1)
2
, (B.2)
Ddh : |C|2 = (1− ed1)(γ
2
a + γ
2
b ) + 2γaγb cos(φ)(1− ed1)
2
,
Dcv : |B|2 = ed1(γ
2
a + γ
2
b )− 2γaγb cos(φ)ed1
2
,
Ddv : |D|2 = ed1(γ
2
a + γ
2
b ) + 2γaγb cos(φ)ed1
2
,
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where φ denotes the relative phase between Alice’s and Bob’s weak coherent states.
Thus, the detection probability of each threshold SPD is
PV = 1− (1− Y0)e−|V |2 , (B.3)
where V = A,B,C,D. Then, the coincident counts are
QHH,ψ
+
Z = 2PAPB(1− PC)(1− PD),
QHH,ψ
−
Z = 2PAPD(1− PB)(1− PC),
where QHH,ψ
+
Z and Q
HH,ψ−
Z denote, respectively, the probability of the projection on the
Triplet |ψ+〉= 1√
2
(|H, V 〉 + |V,H〉) and the Singlet |ψ−〉= 1√
2
(|H, V 〉 − |V,H〉). Here
from Fig. 1, Triplet means the coincident detections of {ch & cv} or {dh & dv}; Singlet
means the coincident detections of {ch & dv} or {cv & dh}. After averaging over the
relative phase φ (integration over [0,2π]), we have
QHH,ψ
+
Z = 2e
− γ
2 (1− Y0)2[I0(β) + (1− Y0)2e−
γ
2 (B.4)
− (1− Y0)e−
γ(1−ed1)
2 I0(ed1β)− (1− Y0)e−
γed1
2 I0(β − ed1β)],
QHH,ψ
−
Z = 2e
− γ
2 (1− Y0)2[I0(β − 2βed1) + (1− Y0)2e−
γ
2
− (1− Y0)e−
γ(1−ed1)
2 I0(ed1β)− (1− Y0)e−
γed1
2 I0(β − ed1β)],
where I0(·) is the modified Bessel function. Therefore, QHHZ is given by
QHHZ = Q
HH,ψ+
Z +Q
HH,ψ−
Z . (B.5)
Here, to simplify Eq. (Appendix B.2.1), we ignore background counts, i.e., Y0 = 0,
and use a 2nd order approximation (as both β and γ are typically on the order of 0.01)
such that
I0(β) = 1 +
β2
4
+O(β4),
eγ = 1 + γ +
γ2
2
+O(γ3),
then, Eq. (Appendix B.2.1) can be estimated as
QHH,ψ
+
Z =
γ2ed1(1− ed1)
2
+ β2ed1(1− ed1), (B.6)
QHH,ψ
−
Z =
γ2ed1(1− ed1)
2
− β2ed1(1− ed1),
and QHHZ is given by
QHHZ = γ
2ed1(1− ed1). (B.7)
Appendix B.2.2. Derivation of QHVZ Alice (Bob) encodes her (his) state in the H (V)
mode (symmetric to V (H)). We also assume θ1θ2 > 0. At Charles’s side, the optical
intensities received by each SPD are given by
|A′|2 = (1− ed1)γ
2
a + ed1γ
2
b − 2λ cos(φ)
2
,
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|B′|2 = ed1γ
2
a + (1− ed1)γ2b − 2λ cos(φ)
2
,
|C ′|2 = (1− ed1)γ
2
a + ed1γ
2
b + 2λ cos(φ)
2
,
|D′|2 = ed1γ
2
a + (1− ed1)γ2b + 2λ cos(φ)
2
.
The detection probability of each SPD is described by Eq. (B.3). QHV,ψ
+
Z and
QHV,ψ
−
Z can be calculated similarly to Eq. (B.4). After averaging over φ, the results are
QHV,ψ
+
Z = 2e
− γ
2 (1− Y0)2[I0(2λ) + (1− Y0)2e−
γ
2 (B.8)
− (1− Y0)e−ω2 I0(λ)− (1− Y0)e−
γ−ω
2 I0(λ)],
QHV,ψ
−
Z = 2e
− γ
2 (1− Y0)2[1 + (1− Y0)2e−
γ
2
− (1− Y0)e−ω2 I0(λ)− (1− Y0)e−
γ−ω
2 I0(λ)].
Therefore, QHVZ is given by
QHVZ = Q
HV,ψ+
Z +Q
HV,ψ−
Z . (B.9)
To simplify Eq. (B.8) we once again ignore the background counts and take a 2nd
order approximation. Eq. (B.8) can be estimated as
QHV,ψ
+
Z =
ω(γ − ω)
2
+ λ2, (B.10)
QHV,ψ
−
Z =
ω(γ − ω)
2
− λ2,
and QHVZ is given by
QHVZ = ω(γ − ω). (B.11)
Appendix B.2.3. Derivation of QZ and EZ Finally, QZ and EZ can be expressed as
QZ =
QHHZ +Q
HV
Z
2
, (B.12)
EZ =
QHHZ
QHHZ +Q
HV
Z
,
where the different terms on the r.h.s. of this equation are given by
Eqs. (Appendix B.2.1, B.5, B.8, B.9). Therefore, together with Eq. (B.1), we could
derive the analytical key rate of Eq. (1).
If we ignore background counts and take the 2nd order approximation from
Eqs. (B.6, B.10), QZ and EZ can be written as
QZ =
β2 + ed(1− ed2 )(γ2 − 2β2)
2
, (B.13)
EZ =
γ2ed(1− ed2 )
4QZ
.
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Appendix B.2.4. QZ and EZ with opposite rotation angle When U1 and U2 rotate the
polarization in the opposite direction, i.e., θ1θ2 < 0, Eq. (B.2) changes to
|A|2 = (1− ed1)(γ
2
a + γ
2
b )− 2γaγb cos(φ)(1− ed1)
2
,
|C|2 = (1− ed1)(γ
2
a + γ
2
b ) + 2γaγb cos(φ)(1− ed1)
2
,
|B|2 = ed1(γ
2
a + γ
2
b ) + 2γaγb cos(φ)ed1
2
,
|D|2 = ed1(γ
2
a + γ
2
b )− 2γaγb cos(φ)ed1
2
.
After performing similar procedures to those of Section Appendix B.2.1, Eq. (B.6)
is altered to
QHH,ψ
+
Z =
γ2ed1(1− ed1)
2
− β2ed1(1− ed1), (B.14)
QHH,ψ
−
Z =
γ2ed1(1− ed1)
2
+ β2ed1(1− ed1).
Since the QBER is mainly determined by QHHZ , by comparing Eq. (B.6) to (B.14),
we conclude that
θ1θ2 > 0 Projection on |ψ+〉 results in a larger QBER than that on |ψ−〉
θ1θ2 < 0 Projection on |ψ+〉 results in a smaller QBER than that on |ψ−〉
An equivalent analysis can also be applied toQHVZ following Section Appendix B.2.2,
and thus Eq. (B.10) is altered to
QHV,ψ
+
Z =
ω(γ − ω)
2
− λ2, (B.15)
QHV,ψ
−
Z =
ω(γ − ω)
2
+ λ2.
Therefore, the key rates of Rψ
−
(projections on the Triplet) and Rψ
+
(projections
on the Singlet) are correlated with the relative direction of the rotation angles, while
the overall key rate R (R = Rψ
−
+ Rψ
+
) is independent of the relative direction of the
rotation angles.
We finally remark that in a practical polarization-encoding MDI-QKD system, the
polarization rotation angle of each quantum channel (θ1 or θ2) can be modeled by
a Gaussian distribution with a standard deviation of θstdk = arcsin(
√
ek) (k = 1, 2),
which means that both θ1 and θ2 (mostly) distribute in the range of [−3θstdk , 3θstdk ] and
the relative direction between them also randomly distributes between θ1θ2 > 0 and
θ1θ2 < 0. Hence, the effect of the polarization misalignment is the same for R
ψ− and
Rψ
+
, i.e., both Rψ
−
and Rψ
+
are independent of the total polarization misalignment.
We can experimentally choose to measure either the Singlet or the Triplet by using only
two detectors (but sacrificing half of the total key rate), such as in the experiments
of [29, 26].
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Appendix C. Asymmetric MDI-QKD
Here we discuss the properties of a practical asymmetric MDI-QKD system. For this,
we derive an analytical expression for the estimated key rate and we optimize the system
performance numerically.
Appendix C.1. Estimated key rate
The estimated key rate Rest is defined under the condition that background counts can
be ignored. Note that this is a reasonable assumption for a short distance transmission.
Theorem 1 µopta and µ
opt
b only depend on x rather than on ta or tb; Under a fixed x,
Rest is quadratically proportional to tb.
Proof : When Y0 is ignored, e
1,1
X and P
1,1Y 1,1Z are given by (see Eq. (B.1))
e1,1X = ed −
e2d
2
,
P 1,1Z Y
1,1
Z =
µataµbtbe
−(µa+µb)η2d
2
.
If we take the 2nd order approximation, QZ and EZ are estimated as (see Eq. (B.13))
QZ =
t2bη
2
d[2xµaµb + (µ
2
b + x
2µ2a)(2ed − e2d)]
4
, (C.1)
EZ =
(µb + xµa)
2(2ed − e2d)
2[2xµaµb + (µ2b + x
2µ2a)(2ed − e2d)]
.
By combining the above two equations with Eq. (1), the overall key rate can be written
as
Rest =
t2bη
2
d
2
G(x, µa, µb), (C.2)
where G(x, µa, µb) has the form
G(x, µa, µb) = xµaµbe
−(µa+µb)[1−H2(ed − e
2
d
2
)] (C.3)
− 2xµaµb + (µ
2
b + x
2µ2a)(2ed − e2d)
2
× feH2(EZ),
where EZ is given by Eq. (C.1) and is also a function of (x, µa, µb). Therefore, optimizing
Rest is equivalent to maximizing G(x, µa, µb) and the optimal values, µ
opt
a and µ
opt
b , are
only determined by x. Under a fixed x, the optimal key rate is quadratically proportional
to tb. For a given x, the maximization of G(x, µa, µb) can be done by calculating the
derivatives over µa and µb and verified using the Jacobian matrix.
Appendix C.2. Properties of asymmetric MDI-QKD
We numerically study the properties of an asymmetric MDI-QKD system. In our
simulations below, the asymptotic key rate, denoted by Rrig, is rigorously calculated
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Figure C1. Asymptotic key rates of Rrig and Rest. Rrig and Rest denote
respectively the rigorous key rate [Eq. (1)] and the estimated key rate (Eq. (C.2)).
At short distances, the overlap between Rrig and Rest demonstrates the accuracy of
our estimation model, while at long distances, background counts affect its accuracy.
An asymmetric system can tolerate a maximal channel mismatch of x=0.004 (120 km
length difference for two standard fiber links).
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Figure C2. Optimal µa and µb. At short distances (i.e., x is around 1 or bigger),
µopta and µ
opt
b depend only on x, while at long distances (i.e., x<0.5), background
counts contribute significantly. The non-smooth behaviors here are mainly due to
background counts and numerical errors.
from the key rate formula given by Eq. (1) in which each term is shown in Appendix B.
Rest denotes the estimated key rate from Eq. (C.2). The practical parameters are listed
in Table 1. We used the method of [34] for the finite-key analysis.
Firstly, Fig. C1 simulates the key rates of Rrig and Rest at different channel lengths.
For short distances (i.e., total lengthLac + Lbc<100 km), the overlap between Rest and
Rrig demonstrates the accuracy of our estimation model of Eq. (C.2). Therefore, in the
short distance range, we could focus on Rest to understand the behaviors of the key rate.
Moreover, from the curve of Lbc=1m, we have that this asymmetric system can tolerate
up to x=0.004 (120 km length difference for standard fiber links).
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Figure C3. Key rate with fixed x. Solid curves are the asymptotic key rates: as
shown in Eq. (C.4), log10Rest is linearly proportional to Lbc. Dashed curves are the
two decoy-state key rates without the finite-key effect, i.e., with an infinite number of
signals. Dotted curves are the two decoy-state key rates with the finite-key effect: with
x=0.9, the optimal intensities are µopta ≈ µoptb and νopta ≈ νoptb ; with x=0.1, the optimal
intensities satisfy µopta /µ
opt
b = ν
opt
a /ν
opt
b ≈ 7 (see Table 3 for some representative
values). The weakest decoy state ω is set to 5× 10−4.
Secondly, Fig. C2 shows µopta and µ
opt
b , when both Lbc and Lac are scanned from
1 m to 100 km. These parameters numerically verify Theorem 1: at short distances
(x≥0.5), µopta and µoptb depend only on x, while at long distances (x<0.5), background
counts contribute significantly and result in non-smooth behaviors. µopta and µ
opt
b are
both in O(1).
Finally, we simulate the optimal key rates under two fixed x in Fig. C3.
(i) Solid curves are the asymptotic keys: at short distances (Lbc+Lac<120 km), the
maximal G(x, µa, µb) is fixed with a fixed x (see Eq. (C.3)). Taking the logarithm
with base 10 of Rest and writing tb=10
−αLbc , Eq. (C.2) can be expressed as
log10Rest = −2αLbc + log10
η2dG(x, µa, µb)
2
. (C.4)
Hence, the scaling behavior between the logarithm (base 10) of the key rate and the
channel distance is linear, which can be seen in the figure. Here, α = 0.2 dB/km
(standard fiber link) results in a slope of -0.4.
(ii) Dotted curves are the two decoy-state key rates with the finite-key analysis: we
consider a total number of signals N = 1014 and a security bound of ǫ = 10−10;
for the dotted curve with x=0.1, the optimal intensities satisfy µa/µb ≈ νa/νb ≈ 7,
which means that the ratios for the optimal µ and ν are roughly the same and this
ratio is mainly determined by x. Even taking the finite-key effect into account, the
system can still tolerate a total fiber link of 110 km.
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